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Resolving the Conflict Between
Fiduciary Duties and Socially
Responsible Investing
William Sanders*
I.

Introduction

In the early spring of 2013, Swarthmore College faculty met
to discuss student demands that the school divest its holdings in
companies that deal in fossil fuels.1 As a speaker began
explaining how that decision would lose the school millions of
dollars, student activists hijacked the meeting and silenced
objectors.2 The activists’ behavior shows the emotion that
sometimes pervades the issue of socially responsible investing,
or “SRI” for short. SRI is the practice of screening investments
according to environmental, social, moral, and ethical criteria.
Whether caretakers of other people’s money, such as trustees
and financial advisers, ought to engage in SRI is frequently—
and sometimes heatedly—debated. But to come to a correct
conclusion, emotion cannot mask cold hard truth. Trustees and
advisers have legal obligations known as fiduciary duties,3 and
these duties may prohibit SRI.
Much contemporary
commentary on this topic is based on the premise that fiduciary
duties do not stand athwart SRI,4 and thus tackles the issue
from the standpoint of policy, asking “should a fiduciary engage
Post-graduate fellow in the Legal and Compliance Department of Christian
Brothers Investment Services, Inc. B.A., Marquette University; J.D., magna
cum laude, Ave Maria School of Law. I want to thank David Skelding for
reading and commenting on a draft of this Article.
1. See Thomas Sowell, Barbarians at the Campus Gates, NAT’L REV.
ONLINE
(May
21,
2013),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/348852/barbarians-campus-gatesthomas-sowell.
2. See id. (explaining how the activists seized the microphone and
“shouted down a student who rose in the audience to object”).
3. See infra note 13 and Part III.B.
4. See, e.g., infra note 203 and accompanying text.
*
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in SRI?” However, this premise is wrong. As this article shows,
unless measures have been taken under certain legal doctrines,
fiduciary duties absolutely do prevent SRI. Unlike many other
critiques on the subject, this article looks at SRI from a legal
rather than political point of view, asking “may a fiduciary
engage in SRI?”
Part I of this article clarifies and strictly defines the
frequently nebulous idea of SRI, explaining its history, trends,
and current status. To give perspective and perhaps temper
hype, Part II discusses the efficacy of SRI as a method of change,
concluding that while SRI may not have much effect on air
quality or oppressive foreign governments,5 there are situations
where SRI is useful and even necessary. Part III looks at the
conflict between SRI and the fiduciary duties of trustees,
investment advisers, and broker-dealers.
It shows the
contractual nature of fiduciary duties and why this is relevant
for SRI. Part III also explores important legislation, such as
ERISA, that affects fiduciary duties in certain circumstances.
Further, Part III examines the superficial and non-legal
analysis in some of the high-profile commentary on SRI. Part
IV offers the legal analysis that has been lacking, examining SRI
through the doctrines of authorization and ratification, as well
as determining the effects of exculpation clauses in trust
instruments and contracts. The article concludes by explaining
when SRI is lawful for fiduciaries and instructing them as to how
they can engage in SRI without fear of breaching their fiduciary
duties.
A. The Definition, History, and Current State of SRI
The definition of SRI tends to change depending on who is
speaking. However, to reach specific conclusions about SRI, it
must have a specific definition. This part defines the term and
explains why that definition is accurate. Then this part outlines
the history of SRI, concluding with a description of its current
state.
5. It is important to note that while shareholder activism, such as
shareholder resolutions, may affect corporate behavior, shareholder activism
is not SRI, see infra note 11 and accompanying text, and is beyond the scope of
this Article.
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1. What Is SRI?
Some commentators say that SRI has no strict definition,6
yet at the same time admit that SRI may put a fiduciary at risk
of being sued.7 Behavior that can lead to legal liability ought to
have a firm definition so that people can be certain when they
are or are not engaging in such behavior. Loose definitions lead
to sloppy thinking, which in turn leads to wrong conclusions
about whether certain behavior is lawful.8 Furthermore, it is
easy to define SRI with clarity and precision. Professor John H.
Langbein and Judge Richard A. Posner have already done so:
SRI is “excluding the securities of certain otherwise attractive
companies from an investor’s portfolio because the companies
are judged to be socially irresponsible, and including the
securities of certain otherwise unattractive companies because
they are judged to be behaving in a socially laudable way.”9
In other words, SRI is making an investment decision based
on social, rather than financial, criteria.10
SRI is not
shareholder activism (e.g., introducing a shareholder resolution)
since SRI refers to the act of investing whereas activism occurs
only after an investment is made.11 Nor is SRI the practice of
6. See, e.g., Joel C. Dobris, SRI—Shibboleth or Canard (Socially
Responsible Investing, That Is), 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 755, 756 n.4
(2008) (stating that SRI has no strict definition and that its definition is
disputed).
7. See, e.g., id. at 760 (“When can a fiduciary take extra risk, in all
likelihood by screening out unloved assets, and not get successfully sued?”).
8. See e.g., discussion infra Part III.D.
9. John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Investing and the Law
of Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 72, 73 (1980). Implicit in this definition are two subtypes of SRI, often called “negative” and “affirmative.” See JOAKIM SANDBERG,
THE ETHICS OF INVESTING: MAKING MONEY OR MAKING A DIFFERENCE? 28–30
(2008). Negative screening occurs when the investor avoids investing in a
company for social or ethical reasons, whereas affirmative screening happens
when the investor decides to invest in a company because of social or ethical
criteria. See id. However, distinguishing between these two types of SRI is
unnecessary for purposes of this article, because fiduciary duties apply
regardless of whether a fiduciary screens negatively or affirmatively; and in
both cases, the fiduciary uses social rather than financial criteria in deciding
whether or not to invest.
10. See Michael Knoll, Ethical Screening in Modern Financial Markets:
The Conflicting Claims Underlying Socially Responsible Investment, 57 BUS.
LAW. 681, 689 (2002).
11. See, e.g., id. at 691 (“SRI should . . . be distinguished from shareholder
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examining social and political factors to determine how those
factors will influence the investment financially.12 For example,
if a trustee decides to invest trust funds in a company because
that company has good environmental policies and the trustee
believes that those policies will result in profit for the company
and strong financial return for the trust, this is not SRI. But
why is this not SRI, given that the decision was based on the
company’s environmental policies? The answer is that the
fiduciary duty of care, which requires fiduciaries to make
prudent investment decisions for the good of the beneficiaries,
would likely compel the trustee to make that same decision
anyway based on the fact that it is a financially prudent choice.13
In fact, it is pointless to discuss whether a fiduciary may decide
to invest (or not) according to environmental criteria if those
criteria determine the investment’s financial aspect—that
question is easily answered, and the answer is yes.14 Real SRI
occurs when a fiduciary makes an investment decision based on
criteria wholly separate from the investment’s financial aspects.
For instance, when a fiduciary decides to avoid investing in a
company—despite its promise of profit—solely because the
company produces fossil fuels or has no women in management
activism . . . . Buying one share of Philip Morris and seeking to place a
shareholder resolution on the ballot directing the company to stop producing
cigarettes . . . might be socially responsible, but it is not [SRI].”).
12. See id. (“SRI should . . . be distinguished from the practice of
examining socially and politically charged factors that might impact on
financial soundness . . . .”).
13. This article explains fiduciary duties in depth in Part III.B, but here
is a basic explanation: A fiduciary has two fundamental duties, those of loyalty
and care. See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary
Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1045, 1047 (1991) (“[M]isappropriation . . . is governed by the duty of
loyalty, and . . . negligent mismanagement . . . is governed by the duty of care.”).
The duty of loyalty requires the fiduciary to act in the best interest of the
beneficiary or client at all times, prohibiting behavior such as self-dealing or
usurping business opportunities. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §
78 cmts. c–d (2007); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.01–8.06 (2006);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959). The duty of care requires the
fiduciary to act prudently to make sound investment decisions that maximize
the beneficiary’s or client’s income, meaning that a fiduciary must take
financial considerations into account when making investment decisions. See,
e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77 (2007); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 8.08 (2006); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959).
14. See supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also infra note 15.
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positions, this is SRI. Of course, it is possible that acting in the
beneficiary’s best interest may result in a socially responsible
investment, but that would not be SRI.15 Failure to grasp this
leads to the mistake of thinking that the duty of care can
actually compel SRI.16 The criteria underlying true SRI are
unrelated to the beneficiary’s financial interest; therefore,
fiduciary duties can never force SRI,17 though they may prevent
it.
B. The History and Current State of SRI
Though SRI may be “in fashion,”18 it has existed at least as
early as the nineteenth century.19 Originally, it was a practice
15. See James D. Hutchinson & Charles G. Cole, Legal Standards
Governing Investment of Pension Assets for Social and Political Goals, 124 U.
PA. L. REV. 1340, 1345 (1980).
It may be that labor-relations practices, compliance with
environmental or safety standards, or other policies could
affect the financial stability and profitability of a company
whose securities are being analyzed. If the fiduciary
performing the financial analysis of the investment activity
has a sound empirical basis for considering these factors,
then their use is defensible on purely financial grounds. The
fiduciary does not override basic financial investment
considerations for the sake of a social objective, nor does he
temper judgments on comparable alternatives by focusing on
noninvestment factors. The question of ‘social investing’
never arises in this setting, and we need not confuse the legal
analysis applicable to ‘social investing’ by belaboring such
practices.
Id.
16. See, e.g., infra note 201 and accompanying text.
17. However, there may be a situation, as explained in Part IV.A, where
a fiduciary is under a contractual, rather than fiduciary, duty to conduct SRI.
18. Dobris, supra note 6, at 767.
19. See Knoll, supra note 10, at 684. Professor Knoll cites evidence of
Quakers practicing SRI as early as the 17th century. Id. at 684 n.17 (citing
Amy L. Domini, What Is Social Investing? Who Are Social Investors?, in THE
SOCIAL INVESTMENT ALMANAC 6 (Peter D. Kinder et al. 1992); ANNE SIMPSON,
THE GREENING OF GLOBAL INVESTMENT: HOW THE ENVIRONMENT, ETHICS AND
POLITICS ARE RESHAPING STRATEGIES 27 (1991)). Professor Knoll also cites
Biblical injunctions against usury, id. at 684 (citing Exodus 22:25;
Deuteronomy 23:16), but these passages do not concern SRI since they are
about limitations on profit rather than investing for the purpose of social
change.
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of Christian investors who avoided putting their money into
activities they considered sinful, such as alcohol and
pornography.20 The first publicly-offered SRI fund was the
Pioneer Fund, established in 1928.21 Like the earlier Christian
investors, the Pioneer Fund screened investments from “sin
industries.”22 SRI remained a seldom-used method of keeping
one’s money out of the devil’s hands, until the 1960s when the
Vietnam War prompted nationwide protest.23 Much like their
ideological progeny at Swarthmore,24 student war protesters
called for universities to divest their portfolios of defense
industry stocks.25 A handful of mainstream SRI funds appeared
within the next few years.26 Social investing became widespread
with the western outcry for the abolition of apartheid in South
Africa in the 1980s.27 By 1993, $625 billion in investments was
screened, and nearly all of this was for the purpose of causing
change in South Africa.28 Once that country’s segregation laws
were repealed, the amount of screened investments fell by nearly
75%.29 It was not long, however, before more people found
reasons to screen more of their investments. By 1999, the money
in SRI was almost a trillion and a half dollars, with tobacco

20. Id. at 684. See also Benjamin J. Richardson, Putting Ethics into
Environmental Law: Fiduciary Duties for Ethical Investment, 46 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 243, 245 (2008) (“[T]he SRI movement began in the anti-slavery
campaign of the Quakers in the 1700s.”).
21. Knoll, supra note 10, at 684.
22. Id. The Pioneer Fund exists today in the form of Pioneer Investments,
though its mission statement highlights its innovative global investment
management and does not refer to Christian screening. Pioneer’s Mission,
PIONEER
INVESTMENTS,
http://us.pioneerinvestments.com/about/corp/mission.jsp?navid=189&navvr=1
78 (last visited Mar. 24, 2014).
23. See Knoll, supra note 10, at 684; Richardson, supra note 20, at 249.
24. See supra note 1.
25. See Knoll, supra note 10, at 684.
26. See id. at 684–85 (referring to the Pax World Fund, which screened
weapons producers, and the Third Century Fund, which invested in companies
sensitive to the environment and their local communities).
27. See id. at 685; see also Bd. of Trs. of the Employees’ Ret. Sys. of Balt.
v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989) (determining the
legality of city ordinance prohibiting city pension from investing in South
African securities).
28. See Knoll, supra note 10, at 685.
29. Id. at 686.
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screens comprising 96% of the total.30
Today, over a thousand investment firms have signed the
Principles for Responsible Investment,31 a set of six tenets
committing signatories to certain environmental, social, and
corporate governance considerations when making investment
decisions.32 These firms manage assets totaling over $30
trillion—about 20% of the total value of global capital markets.33
At the end of 2012, $3.374 trillion of assets in the U.S. were
invested according to socially responsible criteria, a nearly fivefold increase from 1995.34 And SRI is not just for private
investors. The California Public Employees’ Retirement System
(“CalPERS”)—the largest public pension fund in the U.S., with
about $260 billion in its coffers35—proudly asserts its use of
social and environmental standards when making investment
decisions.36 It is evident that many investors admire and use
30. Id. Besides tobacco, “[t]he next most common screens [we]re for
gambling, alcohol, and weapons.”
31. US SIF FOUND., REPORT ON SUSTAINABLE AND RESPONSIBLE INVESTING
TRENDS
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
5
(2012),
available
at
http://www.ussif.org/files/Publications/12_Trends_Exec_Summary.pdf.
32. These principles are commitments to: (1) incorporate environmental,
social, and corporate governance (“ESG”) issues into investment analyses and
decisions; (2) incorporate ESG issues into active ownership policies and
practices; (3) seek disclosure on ESG issues by the entities invested in; (4)
promote the principles within the investment industry; (5) work with other
signatories to more effectively implement the principles; and (6) report on
activities and progress toward implementing the principles. PRINCIPLES FOR
RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, THE SIX PRINCIPLES, http://www.unpri.org/aboutpri/the-six-principles/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2014). Note that the second
principle refers to shareholder activism, not SRI. Also, some argue that the fact
that these principles are heavily subscribed to is unimportant since the
principles are vague and do not require specific action. See, e.g., Richardson,
supra note 20, at 257, 266.
33. US SIF FOUND., supra note 31, at 5.
34. Id. at 11. However, it is worth noting that this amount represents
about 11% of the total assets under management, see id., which is just a small
increase from 1999 when “one out of every eleven dollars in assets under
management was invested using ethical screening.” Knoll, supra note 10, at
686.
35. Press Release, CalPERS, CalPERS Receives Commendation for Best
Responsible
Investment
Report
(June
12,
2013),
https://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/newsroom/news/2013/responsi
ble- investment.xml.
36. See, e.g., CALPERS, TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT: TAKING
RESPONSIBILITY
21
(2012),
available
at
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/press/news/invest-corp/esg-report-
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SRI. However, before taking its virtues for granted, it is worth
examining the effects of SRI on social issues and investors’
money.
II. The Effect of SRI on Investments and Social Issues
CalPERS claims that 66% of every dollar it pays in benefits
is derived from investments.37 But CalPERS fails to mention
that California taxpayers guarantee the fund and pay the
difference when the fund’s investments fail to yield sufficient
returns.38 And despite CalPERS’s ballyhoo about the financial
benefits of SRI, investment failure is rampant in the fund and is
often a direct result of SRI. For example, CalPERS divested its
tobacco holdings;39 tobacco shares then rose and CalPERS
missed $1 billion in profits.40 The fund’s decision to avoid
investing in countries with poor labor records, like China, cost
about $400 million.41 Investments in clean energy yielded the
fund a return of negative 9.7%, though CalPERS’s chief
investment officer, Joseph Dear, did note that it was “a noble
way to lose money.”42
Some believe that SRI can never be more than a losing bet,
and that the only value in it at all is “consumptive”43—the
satisfaction in having promoted a noble cause. Professor
Langbein and Judge Posner believe that social investing is
undesirable because it loses money, and it does not create the
change it seeks.44 They illustrate this by using the 1980s boycott
against South Africa as an example, showing the impossibility
2012.pdf (stating that as of Sept. 30, 2011, CalPERS had $1.2 billion of
exposure to the alternative energy sector).
37. Id. at 2–3. CalPERS claims that the remaining 34% comes from
CalPERS employees and members.
38. See Steven Malanga, The Pension Fund That Ate California, CITY J.
(Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.city-journal.org/2013/23_1_calpers.html.
39. See id.
40. See id. Overall, CalPERS’s returns have been in the bottom 1% of all
large public pension funds in the past five years.
41. See id.
42. Losing with Clean Tech, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 25, 2013),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324557804578374980641257
340.
43. Langbein & Posner, supra note 9, at 94–95.
44. Id. at 96.
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of causing change through SRI: Not only would firms with offices
in South Africa have to be excluded, but also AT&T because it
has phone lines there, and banks that honor South African
checks, and any other business providing goods or services to
that country, even indirectly.45
Professor Michael Knoll claims that it is impossible for
nonfinancial screening to change corporate behavior while
remaining costless to the investor.46 In an efficient market,
meaning one where the prices of securities accurately reflect
their value, screening will prevent diversification47 and thus
increase the investor’s risk.48 In an inefficient market, screening
increases the risk that the investor will exclude an undervalued
security, thereby missing an opportunity for profit.49
Additionally, Knoll argues that the demand curve for stocks is
horizontal, which means that screening out a stock does not
affect its demand; therefore, other investors will simply
purchase the shares that the screening investor did not.50 Like
Langbein and Posner, Knoll challenges the alleged success of the
South African boycott, arguing that it had no effect at all on
repealing apartheid.51
45. See id. at 87.
46. Knoll, supra note 10, at 710–11.
47. Diversifying securities is a method of reducing a portfolio’s risk. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90(b) (2007) (“In making and implementing
investment decisions, the trustee has a duty to diversify the investments of the
trust unless, under the circumstances, it is prudent not to do so.”); Benjamin
J. Richardson, Do the Fiduciary Duties of Pension Funds Hinder Socially
Responsible Investing?, 22 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 145, 152 (2007) (“A fiduciary
should avoid speculative and unduly risky investments and a diverse portfolio
can minimize investment risk.”).
48. See Knoll, supra note 10, at 693–98.
49. Id. at 700–02 (stating that though it’s impossible to test, it stands to
reason that “[a]dding a constraint can only hurt you.”).
50. Id. at 706–08. Furthermore, some funds, such as the Vice Fund,
purposefully invest in companies that SRI funds commonly screen out. See,
e.g., Vice Fund, USA MUTUALS, http://www.vicefund.com/ (last visited Jan. 28,
2014) (“The [Vice] Fund seeks to select well-performing stocks of tobacco,
alcohol, gaming, and weapons/defense companies because we believe that these
industries tend to thrive regardless of the economy as a whole.”).
51. Knoll, supra note 10, at 710 (citing Siew Hong Teoh et al., The Effect
of Socially Activist Investment Policies on the Financial Markets: Evidence from
the South African Boycott, 72 J. BUS. 35, 63–68 (1999See also Robert Heinkel,
Alan Kraus & Josef Zechner, The Effect of Green Investment on Corporate
Behavior, 36 J. FIN. & QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 431, 447 (2001) (arguing that
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Though SRI may not cause social change, there is reason to
believe that it is not necessarily harmful to a fund either. Just
because it may reduce a portfolio’s diversity, almost all of the
benefits of diversification come from the first twenty stocks, so
screening that allows for at least a couple dozen stocks in
sufficiently varied industries will likely not handicap a fund. 52
Additionally, there can be good reasons for social screening. Its
original practitioners never intended or expected their screening
to alter the behavior of others.53 Rather, SRI was a way for
investors to stay true to their principles of virtue and morality.54
Many today still screen investments for this purpose. Christian
Brothers Investment Services, Inc. (“CBIS”) is one example.
CBIS offers investment advisory services to Catholic institutions
and uses Catholic social and moral teaching to screen its
investments.55 Investors with CBIS seek to avoid contributing
to, or benefitting from, investments in activities that violate the
teachings of the Catholic Church, such as abortion and
contraception.56 CBIS uses SRI as one means of pursuing this
goal.57 Institutions adhering to strict moral codes often require
SRI, and companies like CBIS provide them valuable services.
It is situations such as this from which SRI arose and in which
it remains useful today.
Many funds, however, use SRI not for the sake of virtue
alone, but instead claim that screening creates profit. In spite
of its own financial loss resulting from SRI, CalPERS couches its
investment principles in terms of adherence to its fiduciary

though 10% of invested funds are in SRI, that is not enough to change firms’
behavior).
52. Knoll, supra note 10, at 697. See also Matthew Haigh & James
Hazelton, Financial Markets: A Tool for Social Responsibility?, 52 J. BUS.
ETHICS 59, 65 (2004) (stating that research indicates SRI funds “do not
underperform their conventional counterparts.”); Alicia H. Munnell, Should
Public Plans Engage in Social Investing?, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RES. AT BOS.
COLL.,
at
6
(2007),
available
at
http://crr.bc.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2007/08/ib_7-12.pdf (“[A]n investor needs only 20–30 stocks to
construct a fully diversified portfolio.”).
53. See, e.g., Knoll, supra note 10, at 692.
54. See, e.g., supra note 20 and accompanying text.
55. CHRISTIAN
BROTHERS
INVESTMENT
SERVICES,
INC.,
http://www.cbisonline.com (last visited Mar. 24, 2014).
56. Id.
57. Id.
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duty58 imposed by the California Constitution59 and the
supposed financial benefits of SRI to the investor.60 Why
mention the financial benefits of investing against global
warming? Is it not enough that CalPERS is taking steps to
eliminate the threat?61 No, it is not enough. For reasons
explained in the next part, CalPERS has to claim that its social
investing is based in profit for the fund, because otherwise such
investing would be unlawful.
III. The Conflict Between SRI and Fiduciary Duties
The reason SRI is unlawful in some instances is that the
person engaging in SRI may have a fiduciary duty not to so
engage. This Part describes the contract theory of fiduciary
duties and explains why it is the theory that most accurately
describes how and why fiduciary duties arise. Then this Part
explains what those duties require of fiduciaries who engage in
SRI, namely trustees, investment advisers, and broker-dealers.
Legislation may alter common-law fiduciary duties, and this
Part highlights important instances where that has occurred
with respect to SRI. Finally, this Part summarizes previous
attempts to justify SRI in light of fiduciary duties, shows their
flaws, and offers its own justification based on legal doctrine.

58. See, e.g., CALPERS, supra note 36, at 2 (“CalPERS has a fiduciary
duty, which is set out in the California Constitution.”).
59. CAL. CONST. art. XVI § 17(a) (“The retirement board of a public pension
or retirement system shall have the sole and exclusive fiduciary responsibility
over the assets of the public pension or retirement system.”).
60. See, e.g., CALPERS, supra note 36, at 20 (“[C]limate change could
reduce global GDP by as much as 20 percent by 2050.”); id. at 22 (“Climate
change could contribute as much as 10 percent to portfolio risk over the next
20 years.”). Despite its insistence on SRI’s economic factors, CalPERS lets
down its guard a bit when talking about the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico
in 2010, stating that as a major investor in BP, CalPERS was concerned
because “it was not just a matter of environmental and social responsibility but
also financial concern: BP shares hit a 14-year low in the wake of the
Deepwater Horizon spill.” Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
61. This article states no opinion as to whether global warming exists or
is a threat.
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A. The Nature of Fiduciary Duties
The common law has recognized fiduciary duties since at
least as far into the past as America’s founding. Contemporary
scholars and judges argue about whether these duties are
contractual in nature. If fiduciary duties are contractual, then
they do not stand in the way of parties making agreements that
allow what a fiduciary duty would otherwise prohibit. As this
part will show, fiduciary duties are contractual, and the
arguments against contract theory collapse in the face of
evidence.
1. The History and Contractual Character of Fiduciary
Duties
The word “fiduciary” comes from “fiducia,” the Latin word
for “trust.”62 As a legal term of art, the word “fiduciary” has been
used since the seventeenth century and refers to a person who
acts for the benefit of another in “all matters within the scope of
their relationship.”63 A fiduciary duty is one “of utmost good
faith, trust, confidence, and candor owed by a fiduciary . . . to the
beneficiary . . . ; a duty to act with the highest degree of honesty
and loyalty toward another person and in the best interests of
the other person.”64
Common law has recognized the fiduciary relationship for
centuries.65 Traces of it exist in the trust originating at the end
of the Middle Ages. The trust’s purpose was to circumvent
feudal restrictions on land transfer.66
Those restrictions
prevented landholders from transferring their land by will, and
62. Benjamin J. Richardson, Fiduciary Relationships for Socially
Responsible Investing: A Multinational Perspective, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 597, 597
(2011). See also 5 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 878 (2d ed. 1989) (“In
Rom[an] Law fiducia denoted the transfer of a right to a person subject to the
obligation to transfer it again at some future time or on some condition being
fulfilled.”).
63. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 702 (9th ed. 2009) [hereinafter BLACK’S].
64. Id. at 581.
65. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 13, at 1045 (stating that fiduciary
relationships have been recognized in American law for over 250 years).
66. See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts,
105 YALE L.J. 625, 632 (1995).
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instead enforced primogeniture67 and taxes.68 Land was wealth
in those days,69 and people who had it often had desires for it
which differed from those of their feudal lords. Rather than
allowing one’s death to trigger the land-transfer laws, holders of
land (“settlors”) could convey their real property during life to
another (“trustee”) who would agree to transfer that property to
a person of the settlor’s choice after the settlor’s death.70 The
trustee’s only duty in those days was to convey the land.71 Over
time, the trust evolved from a method of conveying land into a
financial-management device.72 The modern-day trustee’s job is
to actively manage trust assets.73 Active management means
the contemporary trustee, unlike the ancient trustee, has
discretion over those assets. Along with this discretion comes
the power to exploit. To protect beneficiaries from a trustee’s
nefarious acts, the law has developed fiduciary duties that
require the trustee to act in the best interest of the beneficiaries
and exercise care in managing the assets.74
These days, trustees are far from the only entities with
fiduciary duties. Attorneys are fiduciaries to their clients;
corporate directors are fiduciaries to their corporations; agents
are fiduciaries to their principals; partners are fiduciaries to
each other; and the list goes on.75 The specific requirements of
these duties are different depending on the relationship.76 For
67. Primogeniture is “[t]he common-law right of the firstborn son to
inherit his ancestor’s estate, usu[ally] to the exclusion of younger siblings.”
BLACK’S, supra note 63, at 1311.
68. See Langbein, supra note 66, at 632.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 633.
71. Id. at 640.
72. Id. at 637.
73. Id. at 637–38. To illustrate the colossal growth of the trust, consider
the contract between the medieval trustees who were not paid for their troubles
and a modern trustee such as Wells Fargo Bank. See also id. at 638–39.
74. Id. at 642.
75. See Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82
MARQ. L. REV. 303, 306–07 (1999) (citations omitted). The type of relationship
that constitutes a fiduciary one may depend on the state. For example, some
states consider oil field operators to be fiduciaries for owners. See id. at 308
n.24 (citing Fransen v. Conoco, Inc., 64 F.3d 1481, 1487 (10th Cir. 1995)
(dictum) (“The unit operator’s duty is fiduciary in nature.”)).
76. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and
Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 432–43 (1993).
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example, a trustee’s duty of care to a beneficiary requires “a high
degree of prudence,” whereas an attorney’s duty of care to a
client is the ordinary negligence standard.77 That fiduciary
obligations exist is certain, but there is debate about whether or
not they are contractual in nature.78 Those who adhere to the
contract theory believe that all fiduciary duties are negotiable,
while those who oppose contract theory argue that there are
certain bedrock fiduciary duties that cannot be waived.79 Who
is correct is important for SRI because if, for example, a financial
adviser’s duty of care cannot be contractually altered, then that
adviser may not be able to engage in SRI on behalf of a client.
Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel are
proponents of the contract theory. They say that in spite of the
moralizing language found in many court opinions discussing
fiduciary duties,80 in reality the fiduciary relationship is not
moral but contractual.81 Fiduciary duties arise when certain
aspects of a contractual relationship are impossible—for reasons
of cost and lack of knowledge—to specify.82 No contract can
make provisions for every possible situation, and fiduciary
duties arise when there is too great a distance between what
parties are capable of providing for via contract and what

77. Id. at 423.
78. See Arthur B. Laby, The Fiduciary Obligation as the Adoption of Ends,
56 BUFF. L. REV. 99, 100 (2008) (“Scholars of fiduciary duties have divided
themselves into two warring camps.”).
79. Id. at 100–01.
80. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 76, at 439 (quoting Meinhard v.
Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (“A trustee is held to something stricter
than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an
honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.”)); see also id. at
428 n.6 (citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5
A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)).
81. Id. at 427 (“Fiduciary duties are not special duties; they have no moral
footing; they are the same sort of obligations, derived, and enforced in the same
way, as other contractual undertakings.”). See also Paul B. Miller, A Theory of
Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 237 (2011) (suggesting that fiduciary
liability “might be better understood as an outgrowth of contract [law].”).
82. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 76, at 426 (arguing that
the duty of loyalty “is a response to the impossibility of writing contracts
completely specifying the parties’ obligations.”). “When one party hires the
other’s knowledge and expertise, there is not much they can write down.” Id.
“A ‘fiduciary’ relation is a contractual one characterized by unusually high
costs of specification and monitoring.” Id. at 427.
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situations could occur.83 Consider the following agreement: A
homeowner contracts with a painter for the painter to paint the
homeowner’s house. This transaction is fairly simple and nearly
all relevant matters and contingencies—such as paint color,
payment, deadline, acts of God—can be accounted for in the
contract. Now consider a contract between an investment
adviser and client: The client contracts with the adviser for the
adviser to invest the client’s money and maximize the income.
This agreement is long-term, the client may have little ability to
monitor the adviser, and outcome may be a bad measure of the
adviser’s performance since luck could be a powerful factor.84
Because there are so many possibilities that cannot be provided
for in the contract, courts impose the fiduciary duties of loyalty
and care onto the adviser as a way of allowing such an
agreement to have value.85
Ignorance makes holes in
contracts—fiduciary duties fill them.
Easterbrook and Fischel use the often-cited Meinhard v.
Salmon86 to illustrate their point. In Meinhard, Salmon signed
a twenty-year lease on a hotel.87 Meinhard paid for half of the
hotel’s renovation and management and received a share of the
profits.88 When the lease was a few months from ending, a third
party offered Salmon nearly ten times the old rent.89 Salmon
accepted the offer without first informing Meinhard.90 The court
held that Salmon had had a duty to tell Meinhard about the offer
before accepting it himself.91 Judge Cardozo claimed to base his

83. Id. at 426.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 426–27 (“[L]egal rules can promote the benefits of contractual
endeavors in a world of scarce information and high transaction costs by
prescribing the outcomes the parties themselves would have reached had
information been plentiful and negotiations costless.”) (citing R. H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3. J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)). Note that courts consider an
adviser’s fiduciary duties to be codified in the Investors Advisers Act of 1940.
See infra Part III.B.2.
86. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
87. Id. at 545.
88. Id. at 546.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 547 (“The very fact that Salmon was in control with exclusive
powers of direction charged him the more obviously with the duty of disclosure
. . . .”).
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opinion on a trustee’s “punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive,”92 but Easterbrook and Fischel argue that the court
was not driven by morality; rather, it was merely creating the
contract it thought would have existed if bargaining costs had
been lower.93
Commentators have proposed numerous theories as to how
fiduciary duties arise and what they require.94 However,
contract theory is the best because it explains not only how
fiduciary duties occur, but why—namely, to fill gaps in
contracts.95 Many attack the theory, but close examination of
their criticisms reveals that they are based on mirages. The next
few pages examine some of the most common arguments against
92. Id. at 546.
93. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 76, at 440.
94. See J.C. Shepherd, A Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships, 97
L.Q. REV. 51 (1981) (describing several theories of how fiduciary duties arise).
Unjust enrichment theory: “[A] fiduciary relationship exists where one person
obtains property or other advantage which justice requires should belong to
another person.” Id. at 53. Commercial utility theory: “[A] fiduciary
relationship will be found . . . in every situation in which the court feels it
necessarqy to hold a person or a certain class of persons to a higher than
average standard of ethics or good faith in the interests of protecting the
integrity of a commercial enterprise.” Id. at 56–57. Reliance theory: “[A]
fiduciary relationship exists where one person reposes trust or confidence or
reliance in another.” Id. at 58. Unequal relationship theory: “[A] fiduciary
relationship exists wherever there is established an inequality of footing
between the parties.” Id. at 61. Property theory: “[A] fiduciary relationship
exists where one person has legal title and /or control over property or other
advantage, and another is the beneficial owner thereof.” Id. at 63. Power and
discretion theory: “[A] fiduciary relationship exists where one person has: (a)
the power to change the legal position of another, and (b) a discretion in the
exercise of that power.” Id. at 68. Shepherd’s theory: “A fiduciary relationship
exists whenever any person receives a power of any type on condition that he
also receive with it a duty to utilise [sic] that power in the best interests of
another, and the recipient of the power uses that power.” Id. at 75. See also
Laby, supra note 78, at 129–48 (arguing for a deontological theory based on
Kantian ethics); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary
Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1402 (2002) (“[F]iduciary relationships form when
one party (the “fiduciary”) acts on behalf of another party (the “beneficiary”)
while exercising discretion with respect to a critical resource belonging to the
beneficiary.”).
95. Note that there are those who admire Easterbrook’s and Fischel’s
argument for contract theory and yet have perceived flaws in it. See, e.g.,
Roberta Romano, Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, “Contract and
Fiduciary Duty”, 36 J.L. & ECON. 447, 448 (1993) (arguing that Easterbrook
and Fischel failed to give a sufficiently specific “economic theory of the
contractual relations to which courts could apply fiduciary labels”).
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contract theory, waving hands through their illusions and
dispelling their clouds of confusion.
2.

Debunking the Arguments Against Contract Theory

One frequent criticism of contract theory is that it does not
explain the existence of core fiduciary duties that cannot be
altered by contract.96 Professor Arthur Laby describes a core
duty as the fiduciary’s obligation to adopt the principal’s ends as
the fiduciary’s own.97 Professor Robert Sitkoff says that a
principal can never authorize a fiduciary to act in bad faith, thus
making good faith a core duty.98 Professor Scott FitzGibbon
gives as an example of a core duty the fact that even with client
consent, attorneys cannot alter their duty to avoid conflicts of
interest with clients.99 While all of these statements may be
true, none of them supports the argument that fiduciary duties
prevent parties from making agreements with regard to any
specific behavior not otherwise illegal. Put differently, core
duties do not define an agreement; rather, an agreement defines
core duties.
As to Laby’s point, the fiduciary’s obligation to adopt the
principal’s ends is no different from the obligations of a party to
any contract. That is, in fact, what contracts are: agreements
under which one party adopts the ends of the other.100 Recall
the prior hypothetical contracts, one between an investment
adviser and client and the other between a homeowner and
painter.101 The adviser adopts the client’s goal of profit and the
painter adopts the homeowner’s objective of having the house
96. See Laby, supra note 78, at 103; Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic
Structure of Fiduciary Law, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1039, 1046 (2011) (“Committed
contractarians have had difficulty explaining why the parties to a fiduciary
relationship do not have complete freedom of contract to alter the terms of that
relationship.”).
97. Laby, supra note 78, at 103.
98. Sitkoff, supra note 96, at 1046.
99. FitzGibbon, supra note 75, at 322 (“[A] lawyer’s duty to avoid certain
conflicts of interest applies notwithstanding client consent to the conflict . . .
.”).
100. See, e.g., BLACK’S, supra note 63, at 365 (defining a contract as “[a]n
agreement between two or more parties creating obligations that are
enforceable or otherwise recognizable at law.”).
101. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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painted. The reason the adviser-client contract includes default
fiduciary duties is because by its nature, unlike the homeownerpainter contract, it has many gaps.102 Default rules might apply
to fill such gaps.103 Fiduciary duties are gap-fillers whose
application depends on the contract’s terms and lack thereof.104
Sitkoff’s argument is similarly weak. Bad faith does not refer to
specific behavior detached from any agreement.105 Rather, “bad
faith” is a generic term given substance only by the contract
itself.106 Therefore, while it may be true that a fiduciary can
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Valentine v. Ormsbee Exploration Corp., 665 P.2d 452, 457
(Wyo. 1983) (“‘[P]arties who contract on subject matter concerning which
known usages prevail incorporate into the agreement such implications if
nothing is said to the contrary.’” (quoting Engle v. First Nat’l Bank of
Chugwater, 590 P.2d 826, 831 (Wyo. 1979)); Olberding Constr. Co., Inc. v.
Ruden, 243 N.W.2d 872, 875 (Iowa 1976) (“[W]here there is no agreement as to
the amount of compensation, the law implies a promise to pay reasonable
compensation.” (citing Sitzler v. Peck, 162 N.W.2d 449, 451 (Iowa 1968)); Hunt
v. First Nat’l Bank of Tampa, 381 So. 2d 1194, 1197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(using the following guidelines to determine what result parties intended
under unanticipated circumstances: reasonable interpretation preferred to
unreasonable one; interpretation leading to reasonable conclusion preferred to
one leading to unreasonable conclusion; interpretation leading to fair result
preferred to one leading to unfair result; interpretation rendering contract
valid preferred to one rendering contract invalid).
104. See Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 899,
906–07 (2011) (“Fiduciary duties are clearly created by contract in that one can
decide whether to be a party to a relationship that includes these duties as a
default term. The fact that fiduciary duties are imposed by default rule rather
than by explicit agreement should not take them out of the contractual realm,
anymore than default rules are inconsistent with contracts in myriad other
settings.”).
105. See BLACK’S, supra note 63, at 159 (defining bad faith as “[d]ishonesty
of belief or purpose . . . .”).
106. See, e.g., Huang v. BP Amoco Corp., 271 F.3d 560, 565 (3d Cir. 2001)
(holding that the lower court’s determination that defendant acted in good
faith was based on that court’s erroneous interpretation of the contract); Grand
Light & Supply Co., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 771 F.2d 672, 679 (2d Cir. 1985)
(“The U.C.C. good faith provision may not be used to override explicit
contractual terms.”) (citing Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594
F.2d 129, 138 (5th Cir. 1979)); Sawyer v. Guthrie, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1262–
63 (D. Wyo. 2002) (refusing to imply, under the duty of good faith, a contractual
provision requiring defendant to drill oil to prevent expiration of leases when
no such provision existed); Oil Express Nat’l, Inc. v. Burgstone, 958 F. Supp.
366, 369–70 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that counter-plaintiffs sufficiently stated
claim for bad faith by alleging counter-defendant had broad discretion under
the contract to perform certain acts and failed to perform those acts in a
reasonable manner); Seidenberg v. Summit Bank, 791 A.2d 1068, 1076 (N.J.
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never act in bad faith, in practice this could not prohibit an
agreement from allowing any specific act since the agreement
itself determines what bad faith is. As for attorneys, unless a
state’s attorney-ethics rules state otherwise,107 attorneys and
clients can in fact waive the prohibition against conflicts of
interest.108
Another criticism of contract theory is that it does not
adequately describe the fiduciary relationship. Laby notes that
there are instances of high specification and monitoring costs
where no fiduciary relationship arises,109 as well as times where
parties have drafted detailed contracts and yet courts have
found fiduciary relationships anyway.110 One example he gives
of where fiduciary duties should arise—but do not—if contract
theory were correct is in the case of securities brokerage.111
However, brokers do in fact have a fiduciary duty to their clients
for the duration of the transaction;112 and when brokers act as
advisers, the fiduciary duties of advisers apply to them as
well.113 As for cases where courts have supposedly found
fiduciary duties despite detailed contracts—some of which
explicitly disclaim fiduciary duties—none of the cases Laby cites
to actually support the argument that fiduciary duties compel or
forbid certain behavior in the face of a contractual provision to

Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (stating that the parole evidence rule does not
prevent testimony regarding claims of bad faith since the purpose of the duty
of good faith is “the enhanced status of the parties’ reasonable expectations.”).
But see Wakefield v. N. Telecom, Inc., 769 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that
plaintiff may show employer’s bad faith if employer fired plaintiff to avoid
paying commissions, though employment contract explicitly said commissions
would only be paid if plaintiff were employed on date of payment).
107. See, e.g., Judith A. McMarrow, Rule 11 and Federalizing Lawyer
Ethics, 1991 BYU L. REV. 959, 959 (stating that state courts have traditionally
“been the primary source for regulating lawyers and articulating standards of
legal ethics.”); Eli J. Richardson, Demystifying the Federal Law of Attorney
Ethics, 29 GA. L. REV. 137, 140 n.2 (1994) (discussing how lawyers and judges
have written attorney-ethics rules). See also infra Part III.C (describing how
statutes can affect and erase fiduciary duties).
108. See, e.g., infra notes 114–116 and accompanying text.
109. Laby, supra note 78, at 110–12 (giving examples such as securities
brokerage and auditors).
110. Id. at 113 n.51 (citations omitted).
111. Id. at 111.
112. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
113. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
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the contrary. An examination of those cases actually shows the
opposite to be true. For example, in Victory Lane Productions,
LLC v. Paul Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, LLP,114 the plaintiffs
sued their law firm for representing them while concealing from
them a conflict of interest—a breach of the firm’s fiduciary duty.
Rather than holding that such a conflict was strictly forbidden,
the court said an attorney could defend against the claim by
showing that the transaction was fair, the client voluntarily
entered into it, and the client fully understood its nature.115 This
principle agrees with contract theory since it would allow an
attorney and client to contract around a conflict of interest.116
Though Laby cites the Second Restatement of Trusts to
counter Langbein’s argument that settlors can alter nearly all
trust rules by trust provision,117 a close reading shows that it
does not actually claim that fiduciary duties prohibit settlors
from making specific provisions which are legal in all other
respects. In fact, the Second Restatement hurts the anticontractarian argument rather than helps it. Laby cites section

114. 409 F. Supp. 2d 773, 775 (S.D. Miss. 2006). The alleged conflict of
interest arose from the defendant having represented both the plaintiff and
another party against the same third party. Id. The defendant was trying to
collect money from the third party on behalf of both clients, but the third party
had limited funds, thus making it impossible for the defendant to represent
one client without detriment to the other. Id. at 776.
115. Id. at 781 (citing Tyson v. Moore, 613 So. 2d 817, 823–24 (Miss.
1992)).
116. For his proposition that courts find fiduciary duties in spite of
detailed contracts that disclaim fiduciary duties, Laby also cites the following
cases, though these cases do not support Laby’s claim: Global Entm’t, Inc. v.
N.Y. Tel. Co., No. 00-CV-02959, 2000 WL 1672327, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6,
2000) (stating “A fiduciary duty must be separate and beyond any contractual
duties”; but not stating or implying that fiduciary duties cannot be negated by
contract); April Enters., Inc. v. KTTV, 195 Cal. Rptr. 421, 428 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983) (stating that joint ventures can be created by parties’ conduct despite a
contract labeling the relationship as something else, but not stating or
implying that it is not the contract that determines parties’ conduct); Singleton
v. Stegall, 580 So. 2d 1242, 1244 (Miss. 1991) (stating that an attorney is bound
by the duties of care, loyalty, and those stipulated by contract; however, parties
in this case did not attempt to contractually waive any fiduciary duties and
court does not say parties would have been prevented from doing so). See Laby,
supra note 78, at 113 n.51.
117. Laby, supra note 78, at 119–22.
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222(2)118 and comment c(2) of section 78119 as evidence that the
duty of loyalty is non-negotiable.120 While those sections do
indeed say that a trust provision cannot relieve a trustee of
liability for breaches of trust done intentionally or in bad faith,
the trust instrument itself (as with contracts, as shown above)
determines what bad faith is.121 In fact, comment c of section
222(2) says that trust terms specifically allowing a trustee to
engage in otherwise prohibited behavior or relieving the trustee
from engaging in otherwise necessary behavior are valid.122
Laby cites section 174123 for the proposition that while the
duty of care can be modified, it cannot be eliminated.124 But as
with section 222(2), this does not mean that there are certain
otherwise prohibited or required behaviors that cannot be
waived by explicit provision in the trust. Case law shows this to
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRUSTS § 222(2) (1959) (“A provision in the
trust instrument is not effective to relieve the trustee of liability for breach of
trust committed in bad faith or intentionally or with reckless indifference to
the interest of the beneficiary . . . .”).
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRUSTS § 78 cmt. c(2) (1959) (“[N]o matter
how broad the provisions of a trust may be in conferring power to engage in
self-dealing or other transactions involving a conflict of fiduciary and personal
interests, a trustee violates the duty of loyalty . . . by acting in bad faith or
unfairly.”).
120. Laby, supra note 78, at 119–22.
121. See, e.g., Nelson v. First Nat’l Bank and Trust Co. of Williston, 543
F.3d 432, 436–37 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding trustee acted in good faith despite
holding allegedly risky stocks because the trust instrument specifically allowed
trustee to hold such stocks and trustee did not act “dishonestly or with corrupt
or selfish motives”); Marsh v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 488 F.2d 278, 282–83 (5th
Cir. 1974) (holding that trustee did not act in bad faith in denying appellee’s
disability benefits trust since the trust instrument required information
establishing permanent disability and appellee failed to supply such
information); see also supra note 106.
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222(2) cmt. c (1959):
If by the terms of the trust it is provided that the trustee shall
not be under any duty to do or to refrain from doing an act
which but for such provision it would be the duty of the
trustee to do or refrain from doing, the trustee does not
commit a breach of trust in doing or failing to do the act . . . .
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959) (“The trustee is under
a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to exercise such care and
skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own
property . . . .”).
124. See Laby, supra note 78, at 121.
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be true. For example, in First National Bank of Chicago v. A.M.
Castle & Co. Employee Trust,125 the court invoked section 174 in
holding that it was a question of fact whether a bank fiduciary
breached its duty by failing to honor an investor’s request for
asset withdrawal within the one-year limit stipulated in the
trust instrument. This decision was based on the deadline in
the trust, which was set by the settlor, and the settlor could have
set a different deadline or no deadline.126 It is only reasonable
that a generic trust provision dissolving the duty of loyalty or
care would not be upheld, because if it were then the trustee
could flout all duties and there would be no trust agreement at
all. Essentially, these Restatement provisions merely say that
the trust instrument can allow the trustee any behavior127 as
long as it does so with a clear and explicit provision.
In essence, fiduciary duties are tools for filling gaps in
contracts. One difference between contract theory and the anticontractarian theories is that contract theory explains why
courts fill such gaps and the others concentrate on how courts
fill them.128 Conflating the “how” with the “why” leads to the
anti-contractarian mistake of believing that the existence of a
gap-filling method automatically necessitates its use, even when
there are no gaps to fill. But on a deep level, perhaps in some
cases verging into the sub-conscience, the underlying principles
guiding opposition to contract theory are not based on law, but
rather on morality. Anti-contractarians take issue with the
notion that contract theory reduces ethics and morals to
contractual arrangement. For example, Laby dislikes the fact

125. 180 F.3d 814, 817 (7th Cir. 1999).
126. Id. See also Chao v. Malkani, 452 F.3d 290, 294 (4th Cir. 2006)
(holding that plan administrator violated fiduciary duties by contradicting
plan’s “plain language”); Dunkley v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 728 F. Supp.
547, 563 (W.D. Ark. 1989) (holding that trustee breached duty of care by
making distributions in violation of the trust instrument, but stating that
those distributions could have been lawful had the trust instrument said so).
But see A.M. Castle, 180 F.3d at 817 (stating in dicta that an emergency
situation could have given the bank the right to breach the one-year deadline
if adherence to the deadline “would have made the investors as a whole worse
off . . . .”).
127. This excludes behavior against public policy, i.e., illegal behavior
outside the realm of fiduciary duties. For example, a trust provision directing
a trustee to invest in illegal drugs would be unenforceable.
128. See, e.g., supra note 94.
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that contract theory suggests there is nothing “unique or special”
(Incidentally, Easterbrook and
about fiduciary duties.129
Fischel agree with Laby on this entirely.130) But why would it
be desirable for fiduciary duties to be “special” and what would
that even mean?131 Likely, anti-contractarians are bothered by
the fact that when the frills of moral finery are stripped away,
mankind’s fundamental goal of efficient economic gain is
exposed, making contract-theory uncomfortably honest. But
honesty is itself a virtue, and when it comes to fiduciary duties,
being honest about what they are makes it easier for people to
contract for what they want, like SRI.
B.

What Fiduciary Duties Require of Trustees, Investment
Advisers, and Broker-Dealers

This part concerns three types of fiduciaries who might
engage in SRI on behalf of another: trustees, investment
advisers, and broker-dealers.132 The fiduciary duties of each
come from different sources and their requirements vary
depending on the fiduciary’s activity. To determine how each
type of fiduciary can perform SRI without breaching their duties,
these duties must be defined.
129. Laby, supra note 78, at 109.
130. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 76, at 438 (stating that scholars
looking for a non-economic explanation for fiduciary duties cannot find one
because “[t]hey are looking for something special about fiduciary relations.
There is nothing special to find.”).
131. Maybe the confusion stems, as Langbein suggests, from the fact that
trusts originated in courts of equity rather than in courts of common law,
where contract law developed. Langbein, supra note 66, at 632–49. Langbein
explains that trusts were kept in courts of equity because common-law courts
were not fact-finding and did not allow testimony. Id. at 635–36. This also
helped to hide from the king the revenue he was missing as a result of his
subjects avoiding the feudal land laws. Id. at 634 n.41. However, given the
many years that have passed since the merging of courts of law and equity,
this is unlikely the source of modern-day puzzlement. See Eric J. Hamilton,
Note, Federalism and the State Civil Jury Rights, 65 STAN. L. REV. 851, 861
(2013) (claiming that states began merging their courts of law and equity in
the mid-19th century, though 4 states—Deleware, Mississippi, New Jersey,
Tennessee—still maintain separate courts).
132. Note that with regard to finance committee members and directors
of entities, if they operate under a trust instrument then their duties, powers,
and abilities to engage in SRI when investing trust funds are analyzed under
the same rules as those of trustees.
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1. Trustees
A trustee is a person who holds legal title to property for the
benefit of another person.133 Trustees have two general fiduciary
duties: care and loyalty.134 These duties exist to ensure trustees
put their best effort into managing the trust and do so with the
objectives of the trust in mind.135 The duty of care requires
trustees to follow the Prudent Investor Rule.136 This rule
imposes on trustees the duty to invest and manage the assets of
the trust as would a prudent investor.137 As mentioned, this
includes a duty to diversify investments unless diversification
Trustees must carefully investigate
would be unwise.138
opportunities and relevant information before making a
decision, and have reasonable grounds for whatever decision
they make.139 Trustees who hold themselves out as having
special expertise in the area of finance and investments must
use this expertise in managing their trusts.140 Trustees may
delegate trust-management tasks to third parties, but they must
133. See BLACK’S, supra note 63, at 1656.
134. See, e.g., supra note 13.
135. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. d (2007) (“The
duty of care requires the trustee to exercise reasonable effort and diligence in
making and monitoring investments for the trust, with attention to the trust’s
objectives.”); id. § 78(1) (“Except as otherwise provided in the terms of the trust,
a trustee has a duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the
beneficiaries . . . .”).
136. The Prudent Investor Rule governs the investment of trust funds,
and its roots can be traced back to Harvard College v. Amory. 26 Mass. (9 Pick.)
446 (1830). See Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and
Investment Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701, 717 n.94 (2010) [hereinafter
Fiduciary Obligations]. Amory said that trustees should manage their trust
as would a prudent man, “not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the
permanent disposition of their funds . . . .” 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) at 461. This came
to be known as the Prudent Man Rule. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
pt. 6, ch. 17, intro. note (2007). However, the Prudent Man Rule’s classification
of certain categories of investments as “speculative,” and thus imprudent,
caused increasing criticism of the Rule. See id. In response to these criticisms,
the Prudent Investor Rule arose “to modernize trust investment law and to
restore the generality and flexibility of the original doctrine.” Id.
137. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (2007).
138. See supra note 47.
139. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. d (2007).
140. Id. (“[I]f the trustee possesses a degree of skill greater than that of
an individual of ordinary intelligence, the trustee is liable for a loss that results
from failure to make reasonably diligent use of that skill.”).
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act prudently in delegating authority and choosing and
monitoring such agents.141 The unifying purpose of these
aspects of the duty of care is to maximize the financial
performance of the trust in accord with the trust’s provisions and
stated purpose.142
The duty of loyalty requires trustees to manage their trusts
in the sole interests of the beneficiaries.143 Thus, unless
authorized by the trust instrument or a court, trustees may not
themselves deal with the trust.144 This prohibition is so strict
that, even if a trustee can demonstrate that such a transaction
was done in good faith, under fair terms, and without profit to
the trustee, the trustee will still have breached the duty of
loyalty.145 Naturally, this duty also prohibits the trustee from
administering the trust in the interest of non-beneficiaries,146
which is particularly relevant with regard to SRI.
2. Investment Advisers
Investment advisers are regulated by the federal
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“IAA”).147 This was the final
act in a series passed to regulate the securities industry and
prevent behavior Congress considered to have contributed to the
1929 stock market crash and the Great Depression.148 The IAA
defines an investment adviser as a person who, for
compensation, advises others as to the value or advisability of
investing in securities.149 Sections 206(1) and (2) prohibit
141. Id. § 90(c)(2).
142. Id. pt. 6, ch. 17, intro. note (2007) (explaining how the rise of modern
portfolio theory engendered the more flexible Prudent Investor Rule so as to
better take advantage of modern investment techniques and theories).
143. Id. § 90 cmt. c.(“The strict duty of loyalty . . . prohibits the trustee
from investing or managing trust investments in a manner that will give rise
to a personal conflict of interest.”).
144. See id. § 78(2).
145. Id. § 78 cmt. b (explaining the “no further inquiry” principle).
146. Id. § 78 cmt. f (“[T]he trustee has a duty to the beneficiaries not to be
influenced by the interest of any third person or by motives other than the
accomplishment of the purposes of the trust.”).
147. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1–21 (2012).
148. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186
(1963).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11).
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investment advisers from defrauding or deceiving clients or
prospective clients.150 Section 206(3) requires the adviser to
inform clients of when their purchase or sale of a security will
benefit the adviser’s own account or the account of another client
of the adviser.151 The first case to interpret Sections 206(1) and
(2) of the IAA was SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.152
This case is often cited for the proposition that the IAA imposed
a fiduciary duty on financial advisers, and the SEC still relies on
it in enforcement actions.153
Capital Gains appeared to follow trust law in its analysis of
the adviser’s duties.154 Like a trustee to a beneficiary, the
financial adviser must act in the best interest of the client. 155
Part of acting in the client’s best interest is fully disclosing all
actual and potential conflicts of interest to the client.156 Much of
150. Id. § 80b-6(1) & (2).
151. Id. § 80b-6(3).
152. 375 U.S. 180 (1963)..
153. See Arthur B. Laby, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau and the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1051, 1052–53 (2011). Laby
argues that Capital Gains did not actually hold that the IAA created a
fiduciary duty for advisers; rather, subsequent cases “misread or simply
disregarded” Capital Gains. Id. at 1053. Rather than holding that the IAA
created a fiduciary duty for advisers, Laby argues the Court believed that
Congress recognized such a duty existed before the IAA. Id. at 1066. Though
Capital Gains never said that the IAA created fiduciary duties, Santa Fe
Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471 n.11 (1977) claimed that Capital Gains did
just that. However, the IAA never describes advisers as fiduciaries, and
previous versions of that Act which did were voted down. Id. at 1069–70.
According to Laby, there are three consequences to this fiduciary standard that
originated in the Court (specifically, footnote 11 in Santa Fe): (1) all financial
advisers are now considered fiduciaries, whereas in the past an adviser’s
fiduciary status depended on the nature of the relationship with the client; (2)
the law governing advisers is vaguer than the law banning fraud; and (3) there
is an issue as to which governing body can change the law now that it is
established. Id. at 1080–1103. However, given that this federal fiduciary duty
is now firmly established for advisers, going beyond noting the duty’s
questionable pedigree is beyond the scope of this article.
154. See, e.g., Laby, Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 136, at 717 n.94
(“The principles of loyalty and care espoused in Capital Gains Research Bureau
are cornerstones of the so-called ‘Prudent Investor Rule,’ . . . .”).
155. See, e.g., SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 146 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Section
206 imposes a fiduciary duty on investment advisers to act at all times in the
best interest of the fund and its investors . . . .”), vacated en banc, 573 F.3d 54
(1st Cir. 1992).
156. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 192
(1963) (stating that the IAA showed Congress’s intent to eliminate or expose
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the litigation against advisers for violating Sections 206(1) and
(2) of the IAA is a result of advisers not telling their clients about
such conflicts.157 Advisers also must ensure that the securities
they recommend are appropriate for each client in terms of the
client’s financial situation and aspirations.158 This entails
examining each client’s circumstances and having a reasonable
basis for recommendations.159
3. Broker-Dealers
A broker-dealer is any person engaged in the business of
effecting transactions in securities.160 For the duration of that
transaction, broker-dealers have a fiduciary duty to their clients
to ensure the transaction is executed.161 But whether a brokerdealer’s fiduciary duties go beyond the bounds of that
transaction can be uncertain.162 This is because the relationship
of broker-dealers to their clients is not always clear. The IAA
does not apply to broker-dealers if their performance of advisory
services is “incidental” to their broker services and if they receive

all conflicts of interest that could motivate an adviser to render nondisinterested advice).
157. See, e.g., SEC v. Gabelli, 653 F.3d 49, 52–53, 61 (2d Cir. 2011)
(granting injunction against advisers who violated the IAA by failing to
disclose to clients that the advisers allowed one client to engage in “market
timing,” an advantage not given to the other clients), rev’d on other grounds,
133 S. Ct. 1216 (2013); Vernazza v. SEC, 327 F.3d 851, 858–59 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding advisers violated IAA for failing to disclose to clients the advisers’ own
interest a certain fund adviser recommended); SEC v. Bolla, 401 F. Supp. 2d
43, 73 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that adviser violated IAA for misleading clients
about the barred status of a co-member of firm).
158. See Laby, Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 136, at 719 (citing
Suitability of Investment Advice Provided by Investment Advisers; Custodial
Account Statements for Certain Advisory Clients, Advisers Act Release No.
1406, 59 Fed. Reg. 13,464 (Mar. 16, 1994)).
159. Id.
160. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) & (5) (2012).
161. See Laby, Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 136, at 725 (“Although
courts impose fiduciary duties on brokers administering non-discretionary
accounts, those duties last only for the narrow window when the broker is
executing a transaction.” (citing Limbaugh v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 732 F.2d 859, 862 (11th Cir. 1984)).
162. Id. at 719 (“Fiduciary law governing broker-dealers is more
ambiguous than the law that governs advisers.”).
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“no special compensation” for such incidental advising.163 It
seems to be saying that broker-dealers are not subject to the IAA
unless they are advisers. But could this not be said about
anyone? After all, the IAA does not apply to truck drivers either
unless they are also financial advisers, but the IAA does not talk
about truck drivers. Why does the IAA even mention brokerdealers? The answer is found in history.
Modern computer technology makes selling securities easy,
but in the 1930s such a transaction was a complex process
requiring the professional services of brokers and dealers.164
Brokers bought and sold securities for their clients directly
through the market.165 Dealers did the same but from the
dealer’s own account rather than out in the market.166 Because
a broker dealt with the securities of third parties on behalf of the
client, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 imposed the fiduciary
duty of loyalty onto brokers, but not dealers.167 This duty only
lasted for the time the broker had custody of the client’s funds.168
Six years later, Congress enacted the IAA and wanted to
distinguish advisers from brokers and dealers since the two
latter were merely “arm’s-length” salesmen, in contrast to
advisers, who gave investment advice to unsophisticated
investors on the premise that advisers had special knowledge.169
Technological advances have reduced the need for professionals
who exist merely to facilitate securities transactions, thus
lowering demand for the traditional broker and dealer
functions.170 These changes forced brokers and dealers to
market themselves as having advisory skills, so that nowadays
it is brokerage that is incidental to advice, not the other way

163. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C).
164. See Nicholas S. Di Lorenzo, Note, Defining a New Punctilio of an
Honor: The Best Interest Standard for Broker-Dealers, 92 B.U. L. REV. 291,
307–08 (2012) (describing the complexity of Depression-era trade execution
and how technological advances have simplified the process).
165. Id. at 301.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See Laby, Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 136, at 721.
169. See Di Lorenzo, supra note 164, at 301.
170. See id. at 303; see also id. at 307–08 (explaining that in the 1930s
and prior, trade execution was a complex process and thus a “vital function” of
brokerage firms).
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around.171 The modern approach in determining if a brokerdealer is a fiduciary is to look at factors such as the client’s
sophistication, how often the client follows the broker-dealer’s
advice, and the broker-dealer’s discretion over the client’s
money.172
It is arguable that there is evidence of a movement to apply
the fiduciary duties of financial advisers to all broker-dealers.
Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) directs the SEC to study
how effective current regulation of broker-dealers is in
protecting consumers,173 as well as the impact of eliminating the
broker-dealer exception from the IAA.174
Dodd-Frank
purportedly gives the SEC authority to establish a fiduciary
duty applicable to broker-dealers equal to the duty of investment
advisers.175 In substance though, this authority does not amount
to anything more than what already existed. Dodd-Frank only
permitted the SEC to equalize the standards of broker-dealers
and investment advisers with regard to broker-dealers who give
“personalized investment advice.”176 The SEC has suggested
that it may use its new authority to require such broker-dealers
to document the basis for their belief that their advice is in the
client’s best interest.177 But since Dodd-Frank limits the SEC’s
authority to establishing fiduciary duties for broker-dealers only
if they advise clients, it is hard to see how this is anything new
given the fact that broker-dealers who also advise are covered
under the IAA anyway.178 For now, broker-dealers can avoid the
171. See Laby, Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 136, at 737.
172. See id. at 723 (noting that whether an account is discretionary is
usually determinative).
173. 15 U.S.C. § 78o note (2012); H.R. 4173 § 913(b)(1) (2010).
174. 15 U.S.C. § 78o note; H.R. 4173 § 913(c)(10).
175. 15 U.S.C. § 78o note; H.R. 4173 § 913(g).
176. See supra note 175.
177. See INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE, SEC, DRAFT RECOMMENDATION
OF THE INVESTOR AS PURCHASER SUBCOMMITTEE: BROKER-DEALER FIDUCIARY
DUTY 8 (2013), available at https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisorycommittee-2012/fiduciary-duty-recommendation.pdf.
178. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Psychological Perspectives on the
Fiduciary Business, 91 B.U. L. REV. 995, 996 (2011) (“[Dodd-Frank] insists on
conjoining the fiduciary responsibilities of brokers and advisers, but then
explicitly sets forth limitations on SEC rulemaking relating to the sale of
proprietary products and continuing duties of care, clearly showing Congress
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by refraining from giving

C. How Legislation May Alter Fiduciary Duties
Dodd-Frank and the IAA are not the only examples of
legislation affecting fiduciary duties. Other examples are
Connecticut’s code specifically allowing the state treasurer to
engage in SRI with respect to the state’s trust funds,180 as well
as state-specific trustee duties.181 Though not legislation, codes
of ethics governing the relationship between attorneys and
clients also affect fiduciary duties.182 Probably the most relevant
statute in terms of breadth of applicability is the Employee
Retirement and Income Security Act (“ERISA”).183 The purpose
of ERISA is to protect beneficiaries of private pension plans.184
ERISA imposes a prudent-man standard of care on trustees of
such pension plans, requiring them to manage the plan “solely”
in the interest of its beneficiaries.185 The ERISA duties are
among “the highest known to the law.”186
Pension-fund
expected something short of true fiduciary responsibility.”).
179. See INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 177, at 6 (“[Brokerdealers] who wish to avoid regulation under the Advisers Act could do so by
limiting themselves to transaction-specific recommendations while avoiding
holding themselves out as advisers or as providing advisory services.”).
180. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-13d(a) (2014) (“Among the factors to be
considered by the Treasurer with respect to all securities may be the social,
economic and environmental implications of investments of trust funds in
particular securities or types of securities.”).
181. See generally John Langbein, Why Did Trust Law Become Statute
Law in the United States?, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1069 (2007) (explaining how the
development of the trust from a land-transfer tool into a wealth-management
device prompted development in trust law to move from common law to
statutory, such as the Uniform Trust Code).
182. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
183. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461
(2012).
184. See id. §§ 1001a(c)(3), 1001b(c)(3). ERISA does not apply to
government-employee pension plans. Id. § 1003(b)(1). As of the end of 2011,
private U.S. retirement plan assets totaled about $13.5 trillion. See FAQs
About Benefits—Retirement Issues, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST.,
http://www.ebri.org/publications/benfaq/index.cfm?fa=retfaq4 (last visited
Mar. 24, 2014).
185. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
186. Gary J. Caine, FSA, ERISA Fiduciary Responsibility: Fiduciary
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fiduciaries must either perform their duties to the standard of
an informed investor (not a layman),187 or hire someone who
can.188
This “exclusive benefit rule” of ERISA—so called because of
the requirement that pension-fund trustees operate “solely” in
the interest of plan beneficiaries189—has been criticized.
Professors Fischel and Langbein point out the fact that unlike
with normal trusts where there is a clear distinction between
settlor and beneficiaries, in employee-pension trusts both the
employee and employer can be considered settlors and
beneficiaries.190 This is because often they both pay into the
fund and both benefit from it in the form of tax advantages.191
Providing for the sole benefit of beneficiaries is further
complicated by the fact that there is often a conflict of interest
between younger and older workers since the plan benefits older
workers more than the younger ones in the present, and ERISA
gives no guidance on how to deal with this.192
Despite its flaws, most seem to agree—and it stands to
reason—that the exclusive-benefit rule forecloses any
opportunity for SRI since pension funds must be managed only
in the interests of beneficiaries, not in the interest of society at
large.193 This holds true even if the trust instrument provides
Reliance on Registered Investment Advisors, at 1, available at
http://multnomahgroup.com/pages/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/White-PaperFiduciary-Reliance-on-RIAs.pdf (last visited May 22, 2015) (quoting Donovan
v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272 n.8 (2d Cir. 1982)).
187. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
188. See Caine, supra note 186, at 1 (citing DOL Reg. § 2509.95-1(c)(6));
see also supra note 141 and accompanying text (regarding the Prudent Investor
Rule’s standard for delegation of trustee duties).
189. See supra note 185; infra note 193.
190. Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental
Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1117–18
(1988).
191. See id.
192. See id. at 1120 n.60.
193. See id. at 1147 (“A principal reason most of the pressures for social
investing in recent years have been directed at ERISA-exempt funds, such as
state and local pension plans and university and other charitable endowments,
is that . . . the perception has been that the exclusive benefit rule forecloses the
issue.”); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-1 (2015) (“ERISA’s fiduciary standards
expressed in sections 403 and 404 do not permit fiduciaries to select
investments based on factors outside the economic interests of the plan until
they have concluded, based on economic factors, that alternative investments
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otherwise.194 Though the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”), in
a letter to Calvert Investments, Inc., said that ERISA fiduciaries
may engage in SRI, the DOL qualified this by stating that an
investment under ERISA made on the basis of non-economic
factors is permissible only if that investment, “when judged
solely on the basis of its economic value, would be equal or
This
superior to alternative available investments.”195
statement cannot be read to mean the DOL construes ERISA to
permit SRI. Rather, it means the opposite. Obviously, an
investment that is superior to all others—or not inferior to any
others—based on economic factors would not put a trustee in
danger of violating fiduciary duties. What the DOL is really
saying here is that trustees of ERISA plans must place economic
criteria above all other factors when making investment
decisions.
However, SRI may be permissible in an ERISA plan where
the plan provides participants with individual accounts and
those participants exercise control over the assets in those
accounts.196 In such an instance, ERISA does not consider the
participant or trustee to be fiduciaries; therefore, ERISA’s
fiduciary duties would not apply to them.197 Statutes like ERISA
might make it easy to determine if SRI is allowed, but what
about where legislation is silent?

are equal.”). Moreover, Congress rejected several proposed ERISA provisions
designed to encourage SRI. See Hutchinson & Cole, supra note 15, at 1365. But
see Ronald B. Ravikoff & Myron P. Curzan, Social Responsibility in Investment
Policy and the Prudent Man Rule, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 518, 531–36 (1980)
(arguing for a broad reading of ERISA that allows for trustees to “incorporate
nontraditional objectives” into investment decision making).
194. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (stating that the trustee must act according
to the “documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as such
documents and instruments are consistent with [the statute].”).
195. Letter from Robert J. Doyle, Director, Office of Regulations &
Interpretations, U.S. Department of Labor, to William M. Tartikoff, Senior
Vice President and General Counsel, Calvert Group Ltd. (May 28, 1998),
available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/programs/ori/advisory98/98-04a.htm. See
also Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Investing in Economically Targeted
Investments, 73 Fed. Reg. 61,734 (Oct. 17, 2008) (“[B]efore selecting an [ETI],
fiduciaries must have first concluded that the alternative options are truly
equal.”).
196. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(A).
197. Id. § 1104(c)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404C-1 describes the
conditions where this ERISA exemption exists.
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D. The Effect of Fiduciary Duties on SRI
Without a statute specifically allowing or mandating SRI,
legal scholars had generally been of the view that SRI violates a
fiduciary’s duties.198 However, in 2005 the United Nations
Environment Program Finance Initiative199 commissioned the
law firm of Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer to determine
whether the law prohibits, permits, or requires SRI.200 The
Freshfields report said that SRI is necessary in two situations:
when social factors materially impact the financial performance
of an investment, or when there is a consensus among the fund’s
beneficiaries that social factors should have weight in
investment decisions.201 Further, trustees may use SRI as a tiebreaker when all other criteria involved in an investment
decision are equal.202 Many consider this report to have settled
the issue of whether SRI conflicts with fiduciary duties.203 But
198. See Joakim Sandberg, Socially Responsible Investment and
Fiduciary Duty: Putting the Freshfields Report into Perspective, 101 J. BUS.
ETHICS 143, 144 (2011).
199. The “UNEP FI is a global partnership between UNEP and the
financial sector.” UNEP FINANCE INITIATIVE, www.unepfi.org (last visited Dec.
13, 2013). The UNEP was established in 1972 and “is the voice for the
environment within the United Nations system. UNEP acts as a catalyst,
advocate, educator and facilitator to promote the wise use and sustainable
development of the global environment.” About, UNEP FINANCE INITIATIVE,
www.unep.org/About/ (last visited Dec. 8, 2013).
200. UNEP FINANCE INITIATIVE, A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE
INTEGRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES INTO
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT 6 (2005), available at http://www.unepfi.org/
fileadmin/documents/freshfields_legalresp_20051123.pdf.
201. Id. at 14.
202. Id.
203. See e.g., Sandberg, supra note 198, at 144 (stating that whether
fiduciary duties allow for SRI is “an issue largely considered to be settled by
the Freshfields report.”). Professor James Hawley of St. Mary’s College of
California said this about the Freshfields report: “[I]t essentially flip-flops the
conventional wisdom on fiduciary duty, completely turning it on its head . . .
[and] the fact that this report was prepared by Freshfields—the third largest
firm in the world, well known as a corporate fiduciary firm—carries huge
clout.” William Baue, Fiduciary Duties Redefined to Allow (and Sometimes
Require) Environmental, Social and Governance Considerations, SUSTAINABLE
INV.
NEWS
(Nov.
3,
2005),
http://dev.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/article1851.html. However, turning
centuries’ worth of wisdom on its head does not necessarily result in greater
wisdom, and while the fact that Freshfields is a large firm may render its
report influential, it does not make it correct.

33

568

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:2

the truth is that Freshfields’s conclusions were based on a
misunderstanding of SRI and a misreading of case law.
First, as said above, an investment made on the basis of
financial concerns is not SRI.204 Therefore, when Freshfields
said that a fiduciary must perform SRI when social factors affect
the investment’s financial performance, Freshfields was not
actually talking about SRI at all. Second, Freshfields’s notion of
consensus among beneficiaries is unrealistic. Social issues tend
to be controversial, and it would be nearly impossible for all
beneficiaries to agree with each other on any of them.205
Freshfields acknowledged this difficulty206 and suggested that
fiduciaries can look to “clear breaches of widely recognized
norms” in lieu of proof of consensus.207 But such norms have
nothing to do with beneficiary consensus, and this solution
merely raises the question of how these norms can be
recognized.208 Finally, the idea that SRI could be a tie-breaker
when investment options are otherwise equal is also a fantasy.
As Professor Joakim Sandberg has argued, it is almost
impossible for two options to be indistinguishable.209 If options
do appear to be identical, then this is probably an indication that
more research is necessary to discover differences.210 And in the
event that there are two equal choices, a prudent investor would
likely invest in both to mitigate hidden risk.211
Though Freshfields cites cases in support of its thesis that
SRI is not in conflict with fiduciary duties, Freshfields’s

204. Supra Part I.A.
205. See, e.g., Sandberg, supra note 198, at 153 (“[I]t is extremely unlikely
that there is a single [SRI] issue on which all beneficiaries can agree.”).
206. UNEP FINANCE INITIATIVE, supra note 200, at 12 (“There are clear
practical difficulties involved in identifying such a consensus by empirical
means.”).
207. Id. See also id. at 96.
208. Freshfields gave “conventions on the elimination of child labor” as an
example of how to determine a widely recognized norm, id., but not only does
such a convention have nothing to do with beneficiary consensus, it is absurd
to suggest that a resolution from an international convention means there can
be no disagreement on the resolution’s conclusion, especially since if there
actually were no disagreement then there would not have been a need for the
resolution.
209. See, e.g., Sandberg, supra note 198, at 149.
210. Id.
211. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/2

34

2014

RESOLVING THE CONFLICT

569

interpretation of those cases is contrived. Freshfields cites
Withers v. Teachers’ Retirement System of the City of New York212
for the proposition that trustees can make “imprudent”
investments as long as they are in the long-term best interests
of the beneficiaries.213 But Withers does not hold that bad
investment decisions are actually good if they are in the
beneficiaries’ long-term interests, and the case certainly does
SRI proponents no favors. In Withers, pension-fund trustees
invested in city bonds for the purpose of preventing the city’s
bankruptcy.214 The city was the main source of the fund’s
income, and its bankruptcy would have rendered the fund
insolvent within a decade.215 The plaintiffs alleged the trustees
breached their fiduciary duty by investing in these
unmarketable bonds,216 but the court found that since the
trustees had “firm grounds for believing” the bond investments
were the only means of preventing exhaustion of the fund’s
assets, their decision to invest in those bonds was prudent.217
This is a far cry from, for example, CalPERS making an
investment in green energy with the expectation that climate
change could reduce global GDP by twenty percent in the next
thirty-five years.218 Consider the drastic difference: In Withers,
there was a direct and easily discernible connection between the
investment in city bonds and the survival of the pension fund,
whereas investing in a company based on the financial effect of
its environmental policy requires two elements which are nearly
impossible to obtain. First, that company’s policy must have a
demonstrable effect on the condition of the environment; and
second, that effect must itself have a demonstrable effect on that
same company’s financial performance.219 Otherwise, the notion
212. 447 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
213. UNEP FINANCE INITIATIVE, supra note 200, at 96; see also id. at 112
n.460 (“[Withers] supports the view that [SRI] considerations can be taken into
account in assessing the likely implications and consequences of an
investment.”).
214. Withers, 447 F. Supp. at 1250.
215. Id. at 1251–52.
216. Id. at 1254.
217. Id. at 1259.
218. See, e.g., supra note 60.
219. To see why this would be almost impossible to prove, consider first
how long it can take for a company’s behavior to cause an observable change
in the environment. Second, even if there were such a change, how could its
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that such an investment is based on financial return is rooted in
nothing but dreams.
Only one of the cases Freshfields cited has anything to do
with SRI: Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore City.220 This
illuminates perhaps the main reason for the lack of legal
analysis in nearly all commentary about the relationship
between SRI and fiduciary duties: There is almost no case law
on it.221 And rather than supporting Freshfields’s thesis, Board
of Trustees is a striking example of the conflict between fiduciary
duties and SRI. During the American uproar over South African
apartheid,222 the city of Baltimore enacted an ordinance
requiring city-employee pensions to divest holdings in
companies doing business in South Africa and stipulated that
those companies would be determined by a list created by a
private organization.223 Pension-fund trustees sued the city,
cause be traced to any particular company when there are so many companies
whose environmental effects can spread across vast distances? Third, even if
such a change could be traced to a specific company’s behavior, how could this
change’s effect on that company’s financial performance possibly be measured?
See, e.g., Hutchinson & Cole, supra note 15, at 1369 (stating that the argument
that a stronger local economy or freer society will benefit pension-plan
participants is a “tenuous link,” making it difficult to determine whether the
purpose of the investment was to benefit the participants or to achieve some
other purpose). However, there are others besides CalPERS and Freshfields
that would claim the link between climate change and a company’s finances is
not too tenuous for a fiduciary’s consideration. For example, Bill McKibben
argues that fossil-fuel companies have “five times as much oil and coal and gas
on the books as climate scientists think is safe to burn.” Bill McKibben, Global
Warming’s Terrifying New Math, ROLLING STONE (July 19, 2012),
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/global-warmings-terrifying-newmath-20120719. Since this inventory is accounted for in the value of the
companies’ stocks, if the government were to prevent the excess fuel from being
burned, the value of those stocks would drop. Id. But even if government took
such action, it would not be accurate to say the reduction in the companies’
values resulted from climate change; rather, governmental action would be the
cause.
220. 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989).
221. See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 20, at 271 (stating that there is little
U.S. case law on SRI because SRI “hardly challenges the economic values that
underpin fiduciary norms”).
222. See, e.g., supra Part I(B).
223. Bd. of Trs., 562 A.2d at 724. Specifically, the statute said the
companies would be identified by reference to the annual report of the Africa
Fund. Id. The trustees challenged this list in court, arguing that it
impermissibly delegated legislative power to the Africa Fund. Id. at 730. The
court got around this by holding that the list was merely a reference, but the
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arguing that the ordinance prevented them from fulfilling the
city’s duty to prudently manage the plan.224 The court held the
ordinance did not force the trustees to violate their duties,
though the court had to twist its rationale around the rock-solid
fact that the ordinance prevented the trustees from optimizing
investments. For example, the court said the ordinance would
not jeopardize the amount of payment to beneficiaries of the
fund.225 However, this is false since the ordinance banned
investments in many large companies.226 The court also
discounted the trustees’ argument that considering social factors
unrelated to investment performance altered their duty of
prudence, though the court cited no actual law in support of its
holding.227

ordinance stated that the companies doing business in or with South Africa
“shall be identified by reference . . .” to the list. Id. (emphasis added). See also
Garrett M. Smith, Board of Trustees v. City of Baltimore: Public Pension Fund
Divestment of South African Securities Upheld, 49 MD. L. REV. 1030, 1040–41
(1990) (stating that the court failed to determine if the list was in fact nonbinding and instead merely said it should construe the ordinance so as to be
unconstitutional). Though the issue of the list has nothing to do with SRI, it is
one more example of the opinion’s addled rationale and a hint that this holding
was driven by a search for particular results rather than adherence to the law.
224. Bd. of Trs., 562 A.2d at 733–35. The court and parties termed the
city’s duties contractual, not fiduciary. Thus, the trustees argued that the
ordinance “unconstitutionally impairs contractual obligations. . . ..” Id. at 733.
However, the court and parties agreed that these contractual duties included
the common-law fiduciary duties of prudence and loyalty. Id. at 734. The
trustees argued that the ordinance altered their duty of prudence “by radically
reducing the universe of eligible investments.” Id. at 735.
225. Id. (“[D]ivestiture does not imprudently increase risk or decrease
income.”).
226. Id. (“While the Ordinances seem to ban investments in many larger
companies with a high market capitalization, numerous opportunities remain
available.”).
227. The court cited 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 227.17 (4th ed. 1988) for the proposition that
trustees do not need to get maximum return and can perform SRI. Bd. of Trs.,
562 A.2d at 736. Though this treatise does in fact say just that—“Trustees in
deciding whether to invest in, or to retain, the securities of a corporation may
properly consider the social performance of the corporation”—it cites no law in
support of its argument. SCOTT & FRATCHER § 227.17. Rather, it merely
analogizes a trustee’s duties to a corporation’s ability to contribute to charity.
Id. Furthermore, the succeeding edition of that treatise recanted its claim that
SRI is permissible without authorization in the trust instrument. See 4 AUSTIN
WAKEMAN SCOTT, WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, & MARK L. ASCHER, SCOTT ON
TRUSTS § 19.1.13 (5th ed. 2007).
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In sum, a close reading of the cases Freshfields cited to
support its conclusion that SRI does not violate fiduciary duties
shows that the opposite is the truth. Trustees cannot lawfully
engage in SRI because their fiduciary duty of care, which holds
them to the Prudent Investor Rule,228 and their fiduciary duty of
loyalty, which requires them to invest only for the benefit of the
beneficiaries, both prevent SRI.229 Advisers and broker-dealers
acting as advisers cannot engage in SRI because of their
fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of the client and to
ensure appropriateness.230 But, as shown above,231 fiduciary
duties are contractual in nature and subject to agreement.
Therefore, SRI will not violate fiduciary duties as long as the
settlor stipulates it or the parties agree to it. They can do this
through the doctrine of authorization. In some instances,
ratification or exculpation clauses also allow SRI.
IV. Lawful Methods of Performing SRI
Trust law has two doctrines that can allow the trustee to
engage in SRI: authorization and ratification.232 Additionally,
exculpation clauses in a trust document or contract may permit
SRI. Authorization occurs when the trust instrument explicitly
allows the trustee to engage in specific behavior.233 Ratification
occurs when trust beneficiaries consent to the trustee’s act or
omission, thus rendering the trustee not liable.234 Exculpation
clauses are provisions in trusts or contracts that eliminate a
trustee’s or adviser’s liability for certain behavior.235 Given the
contractual nature of fiduciary duties,236 advisers and brokerdealers who advise can integrate the principle of authorization
228. See supra Part III.B.1.
229. See id.
230. See supra Part III.B.2.
231. Supra Part III.A.
232. See, e.g., Langbein & Posner, supra note 9, at 104–05 (“[T]rust law
contains two doctrines, authorization and ratification, that permit the settlor
and the beneficiary respectively to waive the ordinarily applicable law and
thus to excuse the trustee from what would otherwise be a breach of trust.”).
233. See infra Part IV.A.
234. See infra Part IV.B.
235. See infra Part IV.C.
236. See supra Part III.A.
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into their contracts with clients to allow SRI. However, they
cannot rely on ratification and should be wary of exculpation
clauses due to the SEC’s warning about such clauses.237
A. Authorization
It is the trust instrument itself that determines the trustee’s
duties and powers.238 As long as the provision in the trust is
explicit, it can permit trustees to engage in behavior that would
otherwise violate their fiduciary duties.239 An examination of
cases demonstrates that SRI is among the behaviors that the
trust instrument can authorize.240 In United Mine Workers of
America v. Robinson,241 a collective-bargaining agreement
increased benefits for widows whose husbands were receiving
pensions when they died but not for widows whose husbands
died before they retired.242 The plaintiffs argued that the
distinction between widows whose husbands were receiving
pensions at death and those who were not had no rational
relationship to the trust and was therefore illegal.243 The trial
court agreed, but the Supreme Court held that because the
terms of the trust stated that the trustees must enforce benefit
levels established in the collective bargaining agreement,
whether or not such a distinction was reasonable was
irrelevant.244 In contrast, the court in Rodriguez-Abreu v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A.245 held that since the terms of the
pension plan did not specifically allow the administrator
237. See infra note 282 and accompanying text.
238. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76(1) (2007) (“The trustee has
a duty to administer the trust . . . in accordance with the terms of the trust . .
. .”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 164(a) (1959).
239. See supra notes 117–127.
240. See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 47, at 168 (stating that if a trust
instrument “expressly requires the trustee” to implement SRI, then the trustee
must do so).
241. 455 U.S. 562 (1982).
242. Id. at 564.
243. Id. at 568.
244. Id. at 573–74 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 164). See
also id. at 575 (“As long as such conditions do not violate federal law or policy,
they are entitled to the same respect as any other provision in a collectivebargaining agreement.”).
245. 986 F.2d 580, 584 (1st Cir. 1993).
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discretion to review claims, such discretion did not exist.246
Case law thus shows that trust provisions are enforceable
as long as they do not authorize otherwise illegal activity or
behavior that violates public policy. This is the fundamental
principle of authorization derived from case law, and this
principle allows for SRI when SRI is not otherwise illegal—such
as under ERISA247—or against public policy. Since fiduciary
duties are contractual, investment advisers and broker-dealers
who advise can use authorization in a similar manner. They
need to ensure that clients who want their investments screened
according to social criteria explicitly agree to this in their
contracts. Advisers must fully disclose to their clients the risks
of SRI.248 Such disclosure is likely satisfied by a detailed
description in the fund’s prospectus or offering memorandum of
how SRI applies to that fund and the risks it poses to the
investor. Once disclosed, clients are free to impose whatever
screening conditions they want on their investments as long as
those conditions do not otherwise violate the law or public policy.
B. Ratification
Even if certain trustee behavior is not authorized, trustees
are not legally liable for such behavior if the beneficiaries
consented to it before or at the time it was done.249 However, a
beneficiary’s mere failure to object is not consent;250 beneficiaries
246. See Sinai Hosp. of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l Benefit Fund for Hosp. & Health
Care Emps., 697 F.2d 562, 567 (4th Cir. 1982) (“[C]ontracting parties . . . cannot
control expenditures from funds already vested in a trust entity where the
trust instrument reposes that authority solely with the trustees.”); Thompson
v. Trs. of Phillips Exeter Acad., 196 A.2d 42 (N.H. 1963) (stating that a trustee
must administer a trust according to its terms and is not relieved of liability
for failing to do so even if such failure resulted from a good-faith interpretation
of those terms).
247. See supra Part III.C.
248. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. Included among such
risks would be the possible harm to the fund resulting from SRI’s mitigation of
diversification or preclusion from investing in certain businesses. See, e.g.,
supra Part II.
249. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. c(3) (2007);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 216(1) (1959) (“[A] beneficiary cannot hold
the trustee liable for an act or omission of the trustee as a breach of trust if the
beneficiary prior to or at the time of the act or omission consented to it.”).
250. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 216 cmt. a (1959).
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can retract consent before the deviant behavior;251 and if there
are several beneficiaries, all of them must consent before the
trustee’s liability is removed.252 For such ratification to be valid,
the ratifying beneficiaries should be aware of all material facts
involved in the acts they ratify and of their rights in the matter,
and must not be prevented from exercising those rights.253
Advisers and broker-dealers cannot use ratification since there
is no analogous doctrine in contract law.254
In Marcucci v. Hardy,255 the plaintiff put his daughter’s
name on his bank account so she could control his money in his
old age.256 The plaintiff sued his daughter after she used this
money to lend $150,000 to neighbors who were in serious
financial difficulty,257 arguing the loan violated the prudent-man
standard.258 But the court did not even consider whether the
trustee violated this standard.259 Rather, since the plaintiff had
actively encouraged the loan260 and knew that the neighbors
were on the brink of losing their home,261 the court found that
the father had ratified his daughter’s loan, and therefore, there
was no breach of duty.262
United States v. Henshaw263 is a case of a defendant’s failed
251. See id. § 216 cmt. c.
252. See id. § 216 cmt. g.
253. See e.g., In re Estate of Lange, 383 A.2d 1130, 1137-38 (N.J. 1978)
(stating that a trust beneficiary may ratify a trustee’s breach of duty and be
precluded from suing if ratification was made with “full knowledge of all the
material particulars and circumstances, and . . . [the beneficiary was] fully
apprised of the effect of the acts ratified, and of his or her legal rights in the
matter.”).
254. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS §
5.14(a), at 209 (6th ed. 2009) (stating that parties must give consideration to
modify an existing contract).
255. 65 F.3d 986 (1st Cir. 1995).
256. Id. at 988.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 992.
259. Id. (“We need not consider whether [defendant] violated the ‘prudent
man’ standard, because . . . [plaintiff] actively encouraged the $150,000 loan to
the [neighbors].”)
260. Id. See also id. at 988 (stating that neighbors had cared for plaintiff
for eighteen months while defendant was away on military duty, perhaps
helping explain why plaintiff encouraged the loan).
261. Id. at 993.
262. Id.
263. 388 F.3d 738 (10th Cir. 2004).
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attempt to use ratification as a defense. The defendant was an
attorney representing a client in bankruptcy.264 The client had
established a debtor-in-possession account (DIPA), and the court
ordered him to open a separate account to hold proceeds of sales
of his property subject to federal-tax liens.265 In violation of a
court order, the client put funds from the property account into
the DIPA.266 Then, the defendant asked his client to pay his
legal fees out of the DIPA even though the client could not
withdraw from the fund without the court’s approval.267 The
court ordered the defendant to pay back the money.268 The
defendant argued that the court’s failure to respond to the
bankrupt’s earlier illegal transfers from the property account
into the DIPA meant that the court ratified later violations.269
However, the court said that ratification only applies when the
beneficiary knows all material facts.270 The court did not know
all the material facts here because, for example, it did not know
of the bankrupt’s latest illegitimate transfers from which the
defendant’s fees were paid.271
Under ratification, trustees who engage in SRI could not be
held liable for breaching their fiduciary duties if all the
beneficiaries to the trust were aware of the SRI and consented
to it. Consent cannot consist of a mere lack of objection, as in
Henshaw, but rather there must be some affirmative
manifestation of consent on the part of the beneficiaries, as in
Marcucci. Unlike trustees, advisers and broker-dealers do not
have the benefit of ratification. This is because advisers and
broker-dealers operate under contracts rather than trust
instruments, and contract law has no doctrine similar to
ratification in trust law.272 Rather, most jurisdictions apply the
pre-existing duty rule to contract modification.273 This rule
264. Id. at 740.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 741.
269. Id. (“[Defendant] . . . attempts to invoke the notion of ratification to
undercut the Government’s effort to reclaim its property.”).
270. Id. at 742.
271. Id.
272. See PERILLO, supra note 254.
273. See id.
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mandates that valid contracts cannot be modified without
consideration.274 Applying the rule to a contract between an
adviser and client, if that contract does not allow the adviser to
perform SRI, then the adviser simply cannot perform SRI unless
the adviser and client amend the contract or make a new one.
Therefore, advisers and broker-dealers should be sure to provide
for SRI in their contracts before engaging in it. After all, if they
cannot obtain permission for SRI in the contract, this means the
client does not want SRI.
C. Exculpation Clauses
As the Second Restatement says, exculpation clauses cannot
relieve trustees of their fiduciary duties if such clauses merely
provide a general statement as to what the trustee is not liable
for.275 However, courts have enforced exculpation clauses that
state exactly what type of otherwise duty-breaching behavior
will not render a trustee liable. In Perling v. Citizens & Southern
National Bank,276 trust beneficiaries alleged that the trustees
breached their duty of care by keeping in the trust stocks that
fell drastically in value. The trustees argued that the trust had
a clause allowing them to hold stock and relieving them of
liability unless they acted in bad faith.277 The court held that
the provision did indeed absolve the trustees of liability for
holding the stocks because it explicitly stated that it would.278
In contrast, the court in Jewett v. Capital National Bank279 held
that there was a question of fact as to whether a clause relieving
the trustee of liability for speculative investments also relieved
the trustee from liability for doing nothing. The underlying
principle governing whether or not courts uphold an exculpatory
clause is that such a clause is valid as long as it is specific with
274. See id.
275. See supra notes 117–127 and accompanying text.
276. 300 S.E.2d 649, 674 (Ga. 1983).
277. Id. at 675. The clause stated “any investment retained by the
Trustee in good faith shall be proper.” Id.
278. Id. at 677 (“An examination of the cases . . . shows the result in a
given case is controlled by the language of the instrument as construed under
particular state laws and general trust principles.”). Note, however, that this
case was decided before the Georgia prudent-man statute was enacted.
279. 618 S.W.2d 109, 112 (Tex. App. 1981).
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For example, an
regard to the permitted behavior.280
exculpation clause relieving a fiduciary from its general duty of
care would not be valid. But a clause relieving a fiduciary from
liability for loss resulting from SRI would be upheld because it
unambiguously applies to specific behavior—engaging in SRI.
Practically speaking, exculpation clauses are little different
from authorization.281 Using either will relieve the fiduciary
from liability for SRI as long as the trust instrument or contract
leaves no room to doubt that SRI was contemplated by the
settlor or agreed to by the client. However, advisers and brokerdealers who advise should consider the SEC’s warning that
exculpatory clauses may violate the anti-fraud provisions of the
IAA if such provisions are likely to make clients believe they
have waived rights of action against the adviser for gross
negligence or willful misfeasance.282 The bottom line is this:
Fiduciaries should not perform SRI unless the source of their
duties and obligations—be it a trust or contract—explicitly
allows them to do so.
V. Conclusion
Socially responsible investing has existed for centuries, and
its popularity has increased in the past few decades. The
motivation of many who practice SRI has moved from striving to
adhere to one’s moral code to a grander notion of changing the
behavior of others. While economics and statistics indicate that
SRI has little influence over society at large, it remains valuable
280. See, e.g., Hanson v. Minette, 461 N.W.2d 592, 597–98 (Iowa 1990)
(holding exculpatory clause explicitly relieving trustee from liability for loss
resulting for error of judgment valid to relieve trustee from liability for loss
due to negligence); Neuhaus v. Richards, 846 S.W.2d 70, 75–76 (Tex. App.
1992) (holding exculpatory clauses may allow trustees to retain unproductive
assets as long as such permission is explicit), vacated, 871 S.W.2d 182 (Tex.
1994); Westview Invs., Ltd. v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 138 P.3d 638, 644 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2006) (holding exculpatory clause explicitly precluding fiduciary and
tort liability valid).
281. See supra Part IV.A.
282. See Letter from Kenneth C. Fang, Senior Counsel, SEC, to Heitman
Capital
Managerment,
LLC
(Feb.
12,
2007),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/2007/heitman021207.pdf.
To determine if an exculpatory clause violates the IAA, the SEC will account
for “all of the surrounding facts and circumstances.” Id. at 4.
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for those who merely want to avoid funding or profiting from
activities they consider immoral or socially harmful. Though
fiduciary duties stand in the way of SRI by default, the doctrines
of authorization and ratification, as well as exculpation clauses,
can allow trustees to practice SRI. Moreover, the contractual
nature of fiduciary duties makes authorization applicable to
investment advisers and broker-dealers acting as advisers.
Authorization allows SRI for trustees when the trust instrument
explicitly permits it and for advisers when SRI is clearly
provided for in their contract with the client. Ratification and
exculpation clauses can relieve trustees from liability for SRI.
Beneath all the history, law, and rhetoric lies one simple
principle: Those entrusted with managing other people’s money
must remember whose money it is and act accordingly.
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